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the history somewhat, we may say that a Tennessee statute

prohibiting the teaching of organic evolution in public educational institutions was held applicable to a public-school teacher of biology.
Mr. Kalven has given us refinements about the statute and the case, but
this is a tenable and simple statement of the result. The Tennessee statute is
still law in Tennessee, though no one seems to know what effect, if any, it is
having today.
Is such a statute constitutional? In particular, is it in conflict with a state
or federal constitutional provision in the form of the first amendment, prohibiting legislation abridging freedom of speech? There is apparently no
decided case which throws any significant light on the problem. Some help
may, as usual, be derived from general discussions in Supreme Court opinions,
for example, the opinion in the foreign language teachers' case. But the statute
raises unanswered questions. If the discussion is speculative, it may nevertheless
have a certain interest.
The inevitable operation of selection in the curricula of public schools and
universities is entrusted to faculties, boards and in the end to legislators.
Though the study by astrologers of critical days in illness is said to have given
us the training which produced Galileo, it is doubtful whether anyone would
seriously advance the claims of astrology to inclusion in a modem curriculum.
Even in the late 1930's few, if any, reputable English or American anthropologists would have proposed that time be devoted to a serious consideration
of Hitler's racial theories, except perhaps as a taking-off place for the discussion
of better-supported views. Last year the University of Chicago withdrew
support from a board of the Chicago Review, a literary publication interested
in printing rather severe and depressing, but outspoken and sometimes "obscene," poetry and stories. It is hard to raise a serious question about the
University's obligation to support any particular administration of a publication
of this sort, though the somewhat censorious tone of the action taken seemed
an example of the improper use of scowling as sanction.
In cases suggested by these three examples, no expert has anything like a
"right" to get or retain employment or to promotion; and a teacher's only
legitimate protection is in cases of contractual tenure. While difficulties may
be raised about contractual tenure, anyone who has seen an administration
carried away by enthusiasm will appreciate its advantages. In the cases suggested by the examples given, only impartial and expert outside testimony
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to the effect, for example, that a teacher is losing his mind, should lead to any
qualification of the guarantees of tenure. Hereafter, everything that is to
be said should be taken subject to a qualification about tenure.
More difficult questions about the use of the sanctions of non-hiring, nonpromotion, the discharge of teachers without tenure, and scowling are raised
by other problems. Since at least as early as 1948, I have consistently advocated
that a good university, private or state-supported, should make a positive
effort to have a qualified Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist, or now a Marxist-Leninist,
on its humanities or one of its social science staffs. I am prepared to recommend
individuals, and for the sake of the argument let us pass the point that there
is no such person who is qualified to teach. Correspondingly I consider that
non-hiring, non-promotion, discharge, and scowling are inappropriate sanctions
to apply to Communists teaching human subjects in a university. Is there,
however, any limit to the application of these sanctions in the text of such
a constitutional provision as that to which we have referred in speaking about
the teaching of evolution? This is an embarrassing question for me, as I am
prepared to suggest that the teaching of evolution, in parallels to the various
cases supposed, has constitutional protection. Let us leave the Communist
illustration, for the moment at least, and recall various questions which the
reader may consider related to it, in reflecting on some problems about the
employment and treatment of individual teachers.
A teacher may be in practical difficulty today as in other days for expressing
in the classroom untraditional views about one or all of the great conservative
institutions: the church, the family, property, and the state. May the views
on these matters seriously held by a competent teacher in the human subjects
legitimately affect his treatment by a university?
Let me suggest quickly some brief answers. It would be shocking to hold
a teacher disqualified on account of atheism from teaching in any of these
fields; but a contemptuous attitude toward the religious beliefs of others might
indicate a feeling which would lead us to reconsider a judgment of competence.
If an atheist can be found who is qualified and willing to teach in a school of
theology, his appointment, however unconventional, would be a useful one.
It would be shocking to hold a student of Kinsey disqualified from teaching
in a department of biology or sociology. Similarly, a professor who thinks that
the ciminal law should not provide punishments for any consensual sexual
relations among adults is not thereby disqualified; indeed this seems to be
the opinion of a considerable number of the most conventional students of the
subject. On the other hand, a teacher who taught, as a University of Chicago
teacher was falsely accused of doing in the 1930's, that no attention should
be paid to any of the restrictions connected with any form of family, would
raise serious doubts about his competence. Whatever their other views about
the family, psychiatrists of standing would agree, I think, that teaching
of this sort is like astrology or Nazi race theory.
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We are considering here problems of teaching and control. The controversial
discussions in question are incidental to teaching in the classroom. In informal
discussion with students, oral or printed, as in public discussion generally,
a teacher's freedom to speak without interference by any of the means available
to an administration should be unlimited, where he speaks on public issues,
up to the point where discussion turns into direction or command. The case
of Professor Leo Koch at Illinois is an example of what seems an improper use
of administiative sanctions. This paper is primarily concerned with a different
subject, but nothing said here should be taken to indicate any doubt that
Professor Koch's public expression of views about the family should be immune
to academic discipline. If his classroom discussion of botany should somehow
lead to classroom discussion of the human family, a problem about his qualifications might perhaps be presented to his university. As the case stands,
he was expressing serious views about an important institution under circumstances where administrative control seems inappropriate.
The family and property are related institutions. It is the Marxist position
that capitalist forms of property depend on misappropriation; the capitalist
theory, that the Marxist revolution depends on misappropriation. I have
suggested that this circumstance should not be a reason here for refusing to
employ or promote a Communist teacher in one of the human subjects. It
must be apparent that a comparable observation could be made about any
refusal on the part of the University of Moscow to employ a teacher disposed
to support capitalist views of property. At the same time, it would be hard
to defend a teacher in Chicago, Cambridge, or Moscow who advocated in
the classroom casual purse-snatching or the misuse of others' funds as a harmless
sport or a relief from psychological tension.
The philosophical anarchist is critical of all the conservative institutions we
have discussed and of the institution of government as well. That quizzical
anti-Fascist, Pareto, whose understanding of Fascism misled Mussolini into
thinking him a Fascist, has an odd observation on this subject. He says somewhere that a philosophical anarchist, because of his detachment, is likely to
make the best teacher of law. There are, of course, many varieties of philosophical anarchism, and one kind of philosophical anarchist is likely to be more
opposed than anyone to what we commonly mean by anarchy. Whatever the
form, the philosophical anarchist-for example, St. Francis or Kropotkin-is
likely to be a stimulating addition to a staff of teachers dealing with any of the
human subjects. If, on the other hand, he becomes an anarchist of a different
sort and advocates in principle the bombing of all government buildings
and officials, he cannot be surprised to find that his promotion is being blocked.
The most troublesome and serious form of the various problems about
individual treatment suggested here is perhaps that raised by issues connected
with the discharge of a teacher who does not have tenure. There seem to me
to be extraordinarily serious objections to the discharge, or indeed the non-

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

promotion, of a qualified teacher, even though he does not have tenure, on
grounds of atheism, scepticism about family or property institutions, or
concern with that remote and sometimes doubtless neurotic ideal of a world
in which the occasions of conflict and the need for public force are almost
unimaginably reduced. Is there any constitutional protection, for example
in an educational institution supported by public funds, against discharge
in any of the situations suggested, including the situation which may happen
to appeal most to any particular reader?
I think I shall not try to answer that question, but leave it as a step toward
what seem to me the somewhat easier questions raised by the Tennessee statute
with which we started. A legislature provides that no teaching of evolution
shall be permitted in a state university containing a department of biology,
or it provides that biology is not to be taught in a state university. Is there
any constitutional objection to such a provision?
Let us take the provision that evolution is not to be taught in a department
of biology and leave it to the reader to consider the provision for a university
without a department of biology. The first objection to the former provision
is that today it is a command to do what is logically impossible. It is like the
famous statute which provides that, when two trains approach a crossing, each
shall whistle and neither shall proceed until the other has passed the crossing.
The second objection is that it is indeed an abridgement of freedom of speech,
protected by any state constitution containing a provision like the first amendment of the United States Constitution and protected also under the United
States Constitution by a reasonable interpretation of the privileges and immunties clause of the fourteenth amendment. It may be that this statement does
not imply that the kind of freedom in question will be protected by any court.
It seems likely that state courts will follow the lead of the United States Supreme
Court in restricting its own power to disregard unconstitutional state legislation,
although that power is rather clearly provided for by the Constitution, and in
restricting-perhaps to an even greater extent-its power to disregard acts
of Congress, a power which seems to have been much more limited by a contemporaneous understanding of the Constitution than our modem views recognize. Our question then is not so much whether the freedom in question will
be protected by the courts as whether it is a constitutional protection which
ought to be regarded by intelligent legislators with a conscientious regard for
oaths to support state or federal Constitution or both. It is perhaps like those
portions of the Constitution which will seldom or never be subjected to judicial
review, for example the power of Congress to declare war, and thus in a rigorous
sense perhaps not law at all. In some respects a constitution serves simply as
a statement of political principle, and we shall be discussing our present problem
primarily in relation to such a statement. We shall, however, suggest a theoretically possible way in which questions of the sort with which we are concerned could be presented for adjudication to a court.

19601

SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND THE SCOPES CASE

Provision for the teaching of non-evolutionary biology alone, in a public
institution, made by a legislature or by an administrative body, appears to
be a serious interference with and an abridgment of freedom of speech. The
speech of teachers is immediately abridged. All the serious apparent consequences follow for students, parents, student or parent taxpayers, community
generally, and taxpayers generally. These consequences result from an abridgment or decrease of freedom of speech as compared with that ideal or "natural"
freedom to which, in the common understanding of its time, the first amendment, like similar state provisions, refers.
A state, in the absence of specific constitutional provisions on the subject,
may doubtless fail to provide at all for public education. It does not follow that
it may provide for public education on conditions which violate the Constitution. A state may prohibit foreign corporations from doing any business
within its territory. But it may not permit a foreign corporation to do business
there on condition that it submit to discriminatory taxation. The doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions has many applications in our law, and it is enough
to dispose of the simple argument based on a state's freedom to avoid undertaking any public education.
It may be not only that astrology furnishes an example of a subject which
may legitimately be excluded from the curriculum, but that it also suggests
problems about kinds of teaching that may not legitimately be included in
a curriculum at any educational institution, private or public. Suppose that
a student who has been taught astrology as a form of astronomy, or nonevolutionary biology, or some of the forms of theological biology currently
taught in fundamentalist institutions, Catholic and Protestant alike, later
discovers the misleading character of the teaching which he has received.
What are likely to be his views about the moral responsibility of the institution
in question? If he feels that he has been mistreated and has spent time and
money uselessly, or even harmfully, has he a legitimate moral complaint? If
so, is not our view of this complaint relevant to our views about the relationship
of the case, at least if it involves a public institution, to constitutional guarantees of free speech regarded as statements of political principle?
It may indeed be suggested that a student in the case supposed would have
at least an arguable cause of action against a private institution or against a
public institution under statutes allowing a public agency to be subjected to
an action for breach of contract. In a few states he may have a tort action
against the private institution, and in a few against the public institution,
for fraud. It is hard to suppose that any educational institution does not "warrant" its teachings free from fraud, and so subject itself to possible contractual
liability on this account. Doubtless a defense based on freedom of speech would
be urged in answer to such a claim. The defense would derive some of its strength
from our common acceptance of the theory of the golden lie and its usefulness
in the work of religion and government alike. It seems doubtful, however, that
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the golden lie is protected by the first amendment or by comparable provisions
in state constitutions.
The golden lie has its uses, and Roman emperors, Catholic ecclesiastical
and lay rulers, and Communist Party leaders alike may base defensible theories
of government upon it. In a world like ours its use is likely to become more
and more impracticable. Nor is it always as necessary or useful as is sometimes
supposed. Simple religious sanctions for the institutions of marriage are, for
many people, no longer available, and the effort to conceal this fact tends to
produce confusion about the natural biological and economic reasons for these
institutions. Theological biology may encourage errors about the causes of
present international tension, and give false comfort about the justice and consequences of an atomic war. It has implications for all our views on public
problems. It seems to be the characteristic gamble of a democratic society
that its members shall have access to all defensible approximations of truth
and that their access shall not be impeded by fraud any more than by force.
The great democracy of Athens may or may not be thought of as having lost
this gamble, but our own democracy seems to assume its acceptance. The
teaching of astrology as magical physics, or non-evolutionary biology as theological science, is inconsistent with this gamble.
It may be suggested in closing that those who are concerned with the role
of religion in our society might consider how persuasive a modern case can be
made for the subtler forms of Greek and medieval religious teaching. Averroist,
Maimonidean, Franciscan, and Thomist theologies have a symbolism whose
poetical and tentative character may be thought of as suitable for understanding
only by the enlightened. If, however, we expect the progressive enlightenment
of ordinary people, they must be allowed some understanding of the hidden
character of the teaching of the great theologians. Denial of an opportunity
for such an understanding may be a defect in education comparable in character
to denial of an opportunity for an understanding of biology and evolution.
Fraudulent oversimplification and the concealed use of myth or magic serve
neither the purposes of science nor the purposes of natural religion. Neither
are they consistent with the policy of free and rational discussion which is
indispensable for a democracy and implied by constitutional provisions designed
to protect freedom of speech.

